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Hamilton: Recent Developments in Minnesota Antitrust Law

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MINNESOTA
ANTITRUST LAW
NEIL HAMILTONI

State antitrust law in Minnesota has undergone a significant
transformation in the last decade. Prior to the adoption of the
Minnesota Antitrust Act of 19711 (1971 Act) the state law was virtually dormant, seldom enforced, and subject to conflicting and
unclear interpretations.2 Passage of the 1971 Act brought a new
activism on the part of both the Attorney General's office and private parties. Consistent state funding and the influx of federal
funds earmarked for state antitrust departments 3 increased Minnet Distinguished Professor of Administrative Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
The writing of this Note was substantially assisted by my research assistant, Irving
Colacci.
1. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 865, 1971 Minn. Laws 1715 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 325D.49-.66 (1982)). The Attorney General's office, as early as 1963, began
working on a state antitrust statute. The Uniform Antiturst Act (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963)
served as the dominant model. The final draft of the Uniform Act was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973. 7A U.L.A. 733
(1978). The Illinois Antitrust Act of 1967, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (SmithHurd 1977 & Supp. 1980), was also used as a model. See Note, Minnesota Antitrust Law of
1971." InterpretationandAnalysis, 63 MINN. L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1979). Although the Minnesota Act is not identical to either the Uniform Act or the Illinois Act, it does retain basic
features of both. Id
2. A useful servey of the history of state antitrust law in Minnesota up to 1965 is
found in French, The Minnesota Antitrust Law, 50 MINN. L. REv. 59 (1965). Professor
French's attitude towards the then existing statutes is summarized by the opening quote of
his article: "[A] tale [t]old by an idiot, full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing." Id. at
59 (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act V, scene v, lines 26-28). The state statutes
carried very harsh penalties, including imprisonment for up to five years and forfeiture of
the right to do business in the state. Id. at 59-60. These harsh penalties had very little
effect on business activity however, there being practically no enforcement of the statutes
in the 50 years prior to 1965. Id. at 60. Even if an inclination to enforce the laws had been
present, the state of the case law left the outcome almost impossible to predict. Id. at 6266. The confusion created by state court decisions dealing with the "rule of reason" lead
Professor French to conclude that the state should rely on federal precedent and harmonize state law with the Sherman Act. Id. at 77. For a survey of the history and development of state antitrust law nationwide, see Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26
U. FLA. L. REV. 653 (1976).
3. See Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2415 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976)) (authorized $30 million for fiscal years 1977-1979). Seegener-
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sota's enforcement of state antitrust laws thereby creating one of
4
the most activist states in the nation.
The increased activity generated a great deal of litigation. 5 The
majority of cases initiated have resulted in consent decrees or other
forms of settlement. 6 Although several district courts have considered the state antitrust laws, 7 Afinnesola-Iowa Television Co. v.
allyEmpirical Research Project, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems with Putting New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 591-94 (1979); Rubin, supra note 2, at
655.
4. See Empirical Research Project,supra note 3, at 570-71. Total expenditures by the
Minnesota Attorney General's Office for enforcement of both state and federal statutes
were $375,000 in fiscal year 1980. The state legislature has appropriated funds every year
since 1974. Federal grants totalling $600,000 became available beginning in 1976. S. KILGRIFF, GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT, ANTITRUST LAW FOR THE BUSINESS AND CORPO-

RATION ATTORNEY 135, 147 (Minn. Continuing Legal Educ. 1980).
5. As of January 1983, 16 cases begun by the Attorney General's office since 1978
were in active litigation. Telephone interview with Stephen Kilgriff, Special Assistant
Attorney General, State of Minnesota Uan. 13, 1982).
6. Consent decrees are the most common form of settlement used in antitrust cases
brought under state statutes. Until very recently, all actions initiated by the Office of the
Attorney General, not in active litigation, had been settled by the use of consent decrees.
A. MACLIN, STATE ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT/INTERPRETATIONS AND PARENS PATRIAE, THE PRACTICAL SIDE OF ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATIONS 54, 67 (Hamline

Advanced Legal Educ. 1979). The use of consent decrees has its advantages and disadvantages. On one hand it reduces the cost of lengthy litigation. Id. However, under the
1971 Act, consent decrees are not available as prima facie evidence in subsequent suits
against the defendant brought by private parties. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 325D.62 (1982).
7. In the most recent district court case, now on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the district court held that the Minnesota wholesale price posting system embodied
in MINN. STAT. § 340.983 (1982) and its implementing rules constitute resale price maintenance and price fixing and are a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court
also found that the state action doctrine does not afford the wholesale price posting system
immunity from the application of the Sherman Act. Intercontinental Packaging Co. v.
Novak, No. 454036 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 1982).
The district court's conclusions are incorrect. Clearly the posting of wholesale prices
involves only information on prices at the wholesale level, and does not permit or require
the filing of any resale prices. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

§ 131, at 377-78 (1977). The district court's conclusion that the wholesale price posting
scheme constitutes horizontal price fixing lacks support in the court's own findings of fact.
A necessary element of horizontal price fixing under § I of the Sherman Act is the existence of an agreement. Section I of the Sherman Act provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce
among the several States . . .is declared to be illegal.
...Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1977). As this language makes evident, a violation of the Sherman Act cannot
be based on unilateral action. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305-06
(1919); L. SULLIVAN, supra § 109, at 311-12.
Unlike the statute in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which required wine growers to file fair trade contracts that
determined the prices at which wholesalers were to resell their products, id.at 99, the
Minnesota statute does not mandate an agreement, and the district court cites no evidence
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Watonwan TV Improvement Associat'on8 is the only Minnesota
from which an inference of agreement among competitors is to be drawn. See Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, No. 454036 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 1982) (order
granting permanent injunction). Each wholesaler posted the price in compliance with the
statute. There was no circumstantial evidence from which inferences of agreement could
have been drawn. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 223 (1939); L.
SULLIVAN, sUpra, § 110, at 315-17. The fact that wholesalers amend their filings essentially
to match the lowest filed prices is normal behavior in a competitive market. But see Intercontinental Packaging Co. v. Novak, No. 454036 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1982) (order
granting temporary injunction). The effect of loss of flexibility to lower prices during the
month is to be expected from the requirements of the price posting statute itself, and
creates no inferences of agreement. The district court made no findings concerning market structure. However, even if the market were concentrated and the prices were being
set strategically with an awareness of the producers' interdependence, resulting in supranormal profits, there would still be no violation. Conscious parallelism in pricing is not
enough to establish an agreement. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc., v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). Considering antitrust challenges to similar
wholesale price posting schemes, other courts have not found the necessary agreement to
apply § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Serlin Wine & Spirit Merchants, Inc. v. Healy, 512 F.
Supp. 936, 939 (D. Conn.), afd sub nom. Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, 664 F.2d
353 (2d Cir. 1981); United States Brewer's Ass'n, v. Healy, 532 F. Supp. 1312, 1329 (D.
Conn. 1982); Enricos, Inc. v. Rice. 551 F. Supp. 511, 513 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
Even if the statutory language of§ 1 requiring agreement is to be ignored, the market
structure elements of a § 1 analysis of the exchange or price information under the rationale of United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1969), are not
established. The district court makes no finding that the wholesale liquor industry is
"dominated by a relatively few sellers." Id.; see also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (fact that price information was made available to retailers
considered to be mitigating factor). Finally, if the requirements of agreement and a market structure analysis are put aside, the state action doctrine seems to provide immunity
for the posting of wholesale prices as provided for in the statute. The wholesale price
posting scheme meets both prongs of the Midca/Aluminum test discussed more fully later in
this Note. See i'nfta notes 38-39 and accompanying text. There is no question that the
Minnesota wholesale price posting system is a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 94, 105 (1980). Minnesota's Liquor Control Division also has "actively
supervised" the program by implementing rules, enforcing the requirements of the statute
and rules, and seeking legislative reexamination of the program. See id.
Besides IntercontitentalPackaging,another Minnesota district court has specifically held
that the 1971 Act is a codification of federal antitrust law. State v. Robert L. Carr Co.,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,983, at 74,185 (Minn. 5th Dist. Cit. 1978). There have also
been two unreported Minnesota district court cases. In State v. Riteway Rigging & Moving, Inc., No. 441177 (Minn. 2d Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 1980), the court dismissed separate cross
claims for contribution against a settling defendant. Unfortunately, the order did not
include a memorandum opinion. In In re Investigative Demand Served upon Maroney's
Service, No. 51265 (Minn. 10th Dist. Ct. July 19, 1981), an Investigative Demand enforcement action, the court affirmed in a memorandum opinion that corporations have no fifth
amendment privilege and ordered the company to produce the requested corporate
information.
8. 294 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 1980). The policy pursued by the Office of the Attorney
General partially accounts for the paucity of judicial decisions. The limited, although
increasing, resources available to the Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's office
result in the prosecution of primarily per se violations, these usually being the most serious
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Supreme Court case to apply the state antitrust laws. The large
amount of litigation, the number of consent decrees and other
types of settlement, and the paucity of appellate decisions have left
several significant issues unresolved. This Note will explain the
court's approach to interpretation of the 1971 Act and recommend
the approach the court should take in the future when confronted
with unresolved issues.
Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T V Improvement Association involved a contract between a translator station9 (Watonwan)
and a television station (KAAL). The contract provided that the
translator station would not broadcast any national programming
that duplicated programming broadcast by KAAL.' 0 KAAL was
an ABC television network affiliate.' I When ABC-TV switched its
Twin Cities affiliate to KSTP, Watonwan chose to continue transmitting the KSTP signal, thus duplicating some programming
provided by KAAL in violation of its contract. 1 2 KAAL brought
suit to enforce the contract.' 3 Watonwan raised the state antitrust
laws as a defense.' 4 The trial court ordered Watonwan to comply
with the contract.

15

On appeal the supreme court interpreted and applied three provisions of the 1971 Act. First, relying on federal case law and the
Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar statutory exemption, the court denied the television industry statutorily exempt status under the 1971 Act because the television industry is
not "regulated" under a pervasive federal regulatory scheme nor is
the nonduplication agreement specifically "permitted" by the Federal Communnications Commission (FCC).16 Second, the court
offenses. The state's burden of proof is less stringent than in the "rule of reason" cases.
Since borderline or difficult cases are seldom pursued past the preliminary investigation
stage the likelihood of settlements is great. See S. KILGRIFF, supra note 4, at 184; A.
MACLIN, supra note 6, at 67-68.
9. "A translator station is essentially an antenna which picks up and rebroadcasts
stations which cannot be otherwise received by individuals in the locality." 294 N.W.2d
at 301.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id at 302.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id at 301.
16. Id at 305-06; see infia notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
The 1971 Act provides: "Nothing contained in sections 325D.49 to 325D.66, shall
apply to actions or arrangements otherwise permitted, or regulated by a regulatory body
or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States." MINN.
STAT. § 325D.55(2) (1982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(2) (1978)). The 1971 Act,
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held that the disputed contract did not violate the 1971 Act's per
se rule against refusal to deal.17 Finally, the court determined that
the contract did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade
under the 1971 Act, treating the question as a fact determination
and deferring to the lower court's finding which were not clearly in
error.18 The following discussion considers these holdings seriatim.
After finding it unnecessary to await FCC determination of the
validity of the contract,' 9 the Minnesota court considered KAAL's
cited as MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8011-.8028 (1978) in Watonwan, was renumbered by the Revisor of Statutes in 1980. The renumbering did not affect the substance of the 1971 Act.
This Note will cite to the present section numbers and indicate parenthetically the 1978
section numbers when helpful.
17. 294 N.W.2d at 306-07; see tnfia notes 45-60 and accompanying text. Section
325D.53 of the 1971 Act provides a list of actions that, if proven, are per se unreasonable
restraints of trade and unlawful. The specific provision considered in Walonwan states,
"[T]he following shall be deemed to restrain trade or commerce unreasonably and are
A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons refusunlawful: ...
ing to deal with another person." MINN. STAT. § 325D.53, subd. 1(3) (1982) (previously
MINN. STAT. § 325.8015, subd. 1(3) (1978)).
18. 294 N.W.2d at 306-07; see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. The court
construed the section of the 1971 Act which provides that "[a] contract, combination, or
conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is
unlawful." MINN. STAT. § 325D.51 (982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8013 (1978)).
19. 294 N.W.2d at 302-03. In determining there was no requirement to await a FCC
determination regarding the validity of the contract, the court rejected three arguments.
The doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," considerations of comity, and matters of convenience were held insufficient to compel the court to defer to the federal agency. Id.
To promote the effectiveness of administrative agencies the United States Supreme
Court developed the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction." Coordination between agencies
and the judiciary was perceived to promote the ends to which both strive. See United
States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939). The doctrine compels courts to avoid "passing over" agencies when cases involve "issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or . . . requir[e] the exercies of administrative discretion." Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952). Minnesota has expressly adopted
the federal interpretation of the doctrine. See State ex re. PCA v. United States Steel
Corp., 307 Minn. 374, 380, 240 N.W.2d 316, 319 (1976).
The "primary jurisdiction" doctrine was not applicable in Watonwan for two reasons.
First, FCC approved actions are not insulated from the reach of antitrust statutes. 294
N.W.2d at 302; see United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 348-50 (1958). Second, the question on which the FCC would rule differed from the issue facing the court. The FCC
would have ruled on the validity of the contract under regulations promulgated by the
agency. The Watonwan court faced the issue of whether the contract violated provisions of
the state antitrust laws. See 294 N.W.2d at 302-03.
Practical considerations precluded the use of comity and convenience as grounds to
await an FCC decision. Watonwan's claims were on appeal before the FCC at the time of
the court's consideration of the case. The FCC appeal sought a new agency policy prohibiting voluntary nonduplication protection agreements between translators and their primary stations. The probability of a long delay before a final decision by the FCC and the
improbability that Watonwan would prevail convinced the court that waiting for such a
decision was not required. See id
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defense that the nonduplication agreement was beyond the reach
of the antitrust statute.2 0 The 1971 Act exempts "actions or arrangements otherwise pennitted, or regulated by any regulatory body
or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the
United States."' 2 1 No prior Minnesota Supreme Court decision ad23
22
dressed this provision, so the court turned to federal case law,

the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar provision
in that state's antitrust statute, 24 and the suggestion of a commentator2 5 to interpret the Minnesota statute.
The court articulated the principle that exceptions to antitrust
laws should be narrowly construed to effectuate the competitive
purposes of the statute.2 6 It then focused on the meanings of "regulated" and "permitted" in the Minnesota statute. To define
"regulated," the court resorted to federal cases concerning conduct
by federally regulated firms, and adopted the suggested principle
that antitrust immunity cannot be inferred in the absence of pervasive agency regulation.2 7 Since FCC regulation is not a "pervasive regulatory scheme," the actions of the stations were found
28
nonexempt.
20. See 294 N.W.2d at 305.
21. MINN. STAT. § 325D.55(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
22. See 204 N.W.2d at 305.
23. Id. at 305-06. In Watonwan the court relied on several United States Supreme
Court decisions to interpret the Minnesota statutes. Id. at 305-06. The reliance on federal
case law is significant. The 1971 Act does not expressly instruct courts to look to federal
case law when interpreting the state statute. At least one state's antitrust statute so provides. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.141 (Vernon 1979).
There are advantages to relying on federal precedent. First, such reliance provides a
large body of precedent on which state courts can draw, promoting consistency and predictability in the interpretation of antitrust laws. Second, fashioning new principles and
applications of antitrust law could strain the resources and capabilities of state courts.
Reliance on the well-developed principles and theories of federal antitrust law minimizes
this possibility. However, there are two disadvantages to this approach. First, one purpose of state antitrust statute is to develop state policies addressing local problems and
concerns. Federal law may ignore or cloud distinctively local concerns. Second, federal
precedent may be confused, contradictory, or inapplicable, and therefore, not helpful. See
infa notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
24. See 294 N.W.2d at 306. The court discussed and relied upon the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision in Fischer, Spuhl, Herzwurm & Assocs. v. Forrest T. Jones &
Co., 586 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1979) (construing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.041.2 (Vernon 1979)).
25. See 294 N.W.2d at 305. The court relied on the interpretation of the 1971 Act
discussed in Note, supra note 1, at 939-40.
26. 294 N.W.2d at 305; see Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n,
425 U.S. 1,11 (1976).
27. 294 N.W.2d at 305-06.
28. See id at 306. In United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), the Supreme Court
resolved the issue of whether the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine barred judicial determi-
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The second prong of the exemption asks whether the challenged
action is "permitted" by a regulatory agency. To interpret the
statute the court resorted to the state action doctrine, initially developed by the United States Supreme Court, 29 and recently
adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in a case which interpreted the Missouri antitrust statute that contains the words "expressly approved" in place of "permitted. '30 The Watonwan court
permitted
concluded that actions must be "required or3specifically
1
by the government" in order to be exempt.
After Watonwan the interpretation of the exemption provision in
the 1971 Act remains unclear. In defining the statutory terms
"regulated" and "permitted," the Minnesota court borrowed from
two distinct federal antitrust doctrines. The definition of "regulated" is taken from federal antitrust doctrine defining the extent
of antitrust immunity granted to afederally regulated firm. To define "permitted," the court borrowed from federal antitrust law
defining the antitrust immunity granted to a state regulated firm.
The two doctrines are related in the sense that in both cases a
government directs an action inconsistent with the antitrust laws
thereby implicitly determining that the role of competition should
to some extent be displaced. However, the precise issue presented
and the analytical frameworks adopted are somewhat different. If
the governmental action is federal, the analytical issue is whether
nation of antitrust violations when the alledgedly illegal actions had been taken with FCC
approval. Id. at 346-52. The Court held that the doctrine was inapplicable and that
defendant's actions were within the purview of the antitrust laws. Id. at 350. Although
the television and radio industries are heavily regulated there is "no pervasive regulatory
scheme and no rate structure to throw out of balance, and sporadic action by federal
courts can work no mischief. The justification for primary jurisdiction accordingly disappears." Id.; see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
29. The "state action" doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court excludes actions
taken pursuant to state authority from the purview of the federal antitrust laws. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
30. See Fischer, Spuhl, Herzwurm & Assocs. v. Forrest T. Jones & Co., 586 S.W.2d
310, 313 (Mo. 1979); compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.041.2 (Vernon 1979) ("Nothing contained in the Missouri antitrust law shall be construed to apply to activities or arrangements expressly approved or regulated by any regulatory body or officer acting under
statutory authority of this state or of the United States.") with MINN. STAT. § 325D.55(2)
(1982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(2) (1978)) ("Nothing contained in [the Minnesota antitrust laws] shall apply to actions or arrangements otherwise permitted, or regulated by a regulatory body or officer acting under authority of this state or the United
States.")
31. 294 N.W.2d at 306.
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the legislation authorizing the action is an "implied repeal" of the
antitrust laws. When state action is involved, more complex questions of federalism arise. 32 Intermingling the two federal antitrust
doctrines in interpreting the same provision of the 1971 Act may
33
lead to confusion.
The Watonwan court developed neither doctrine fully. In applying the federal antitrust doctrine defining antitrust immunity
granted to a federally regulated firm, the Minnesota court focused
totally on the "pervasiveness" of the regulation. Areeda probes
this rationale:
To be sure, an agency continually and deeply involved in the
comprehensive details of an industry is more likely to develop
special insights into industry circumstances and into the economic implications of prohibiting challenged conduct. But the
scope and intensity of a regulatory regime does not indicate the
extent to which Congress intended to confer antitrust immunity
or to vest the responsibility for competition in the regulators
rather than the courts. The main issue is not the breadth of
regulation within an industry, but the impact of regulation on
the challenged conduct. Such determinations often demand a
particularized inquiry
into the history and purposes of the reg3 4
ulatory statute.
In other words the "pervasiveness" analysis is too conclusory to be
sufficient; it should only be one relevant factor in determining the
congressional intent to commit responsibility for an industry to an
agency rather than to market forces.
The "state action" doctrine also was not fully developed in the
Watonwan decision. After mentioning the Supreme Court cases of
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 3 5 and California Retad Liquor Dealers Association v. MidcalAluminum, Inc. ,36 the Minnesota court concluded
that "the foregoing decisions indicate that the exemption from antitrust laws for government approved activities has generally been
32. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, § 235, at 719. But see L. SULLIVAN, Supra note 7, § 238,
at 737.
33. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-61
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 223b, at 137-38 (1978); see id.
§ 224a, at 144-45; id. § 224e, at 154; National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Kansas
City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). In National Genmedical the Court commented, "Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only by a convincing showing of clear
repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system." Id. at 388, citintg
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975).
35. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
36. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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limited to activities either requested or specifically permitted by
the government. ' 37 This articulates only half the test for state action immunity. Under the federal cases, there can be no state action immunity without both (1) a clear state command to displace
antitrust law and (2) active public supervision. 3 The requirement
of active state supervision is a response to federalism concerns.
The states, when the public interest so requires, should be able to
define areas inappropriate for market control. On the other hand,
Congress, through the Sherman Act, has dictated that the market
should control private economic activity. The federal-state conflict is resolved through the active supervision that demonstrates
both the state's commitment to regulatory oversight and prevents
39
private activity unrestrained by competition or supervision.
A clearer understanding of the exemption provision of the 1971
Act will develop if the court chooses to interpret the provision in
the light of either the state action immunity or the implied antitrust immunity for a federally regulated industry. 4° The Missouri
Supreme Court adopted the former approach in Fsher, Spuhl,
Herzwurm &Associates v. Forrest T Jones & Co. 41 The Missouri court
interpreted a state antitrust statute that exempted "activities or
arrangements expressly approved or regulated by any regulatory
body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or of
the United States."'42 The issue was whether certain insurance industry activities were regulated by the state and therefore exempt.
The Missouri court avoided the confusion introduced by the Minnesota court and held that the entire statutory exemption "represents a codification of the 'state action' doctrine of the federal
antitrust law." '43 Since all state regulation is subject to the federal
state action doctrine in any event, it makes sense to. follow Missouri's interpretation of the exemption provision and to view the
exemption provision of the 1971 Act as a codification of the state
44
action doctrine.
37. 294 N.W.2d at 306.
38. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980);see I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 34, § 213a, at 72; id. § 214a, at 83.
39. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 34, § 213a, at 73.
40. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-62
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. 586 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Mo. 1979).
42. Id. (enforcing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.041.2 (Vernon 1979)).
43. Id. at 314.
44. But note that one commentator states that the legislative history indicates that a
listing of statutes exempting industries from the state antitrust act was an alternative pro-
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After determining there was no exemption, the Watonwan court
considered the second major issue: the merits of the antitrust
claims. Under the 1971 Act, refusal to deal constitutes a per se
violation of the statute and can be criminally prosecuted if undertaken "willfully. ''45 The Minnesota court applied this provision
strictly, finding under the facts that the provision in the contract
'46
was "unlike the type of agreement classified as a refusal to deal."
The court stated a number of reasons for its finding: 47 First, the
contract did not specifically refer to a particular station with
whom Watonwan was forbidden to deal, but only to any station
carrying ABC programming. Second, the contract did not prohibit the broadcasting of other stations' programming but only
vision of the model act on which the 1971 Act is based. This suggests the issue is one of
legislative intent and the adoption of the federal case law on antitrust immunity for a
federally regulated industry may be appropriate. See Note, supra note 1, at 939-40. On the
other hand, the statute appears to reflect the prevailing thought at the time of enactment
in 1971 that the state action exemption required only state involvement, the old Parker v.
Brown holding. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The holding of Parkerv. Brown
has been substantially narrowed by the Supreme Court sinde 1975 beginning with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. MINN. STAT. § 325D.56(2) (1982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8018 (1978))
provides:
Any person who is found to have willfully committed any of the acts enumerated
in section 325D.53 [the per se violations section (previously § 325.8015)] shall be
guilty of a felony and subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment
in the state penitentiary for not more than five years, or both.
The question that arises in connection with this provision is what is "willful." Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in non-antitrust cases indicate that the violator must intend
to engage in the conduct and to commit the crime alleged. See State v. Everson, 286
Minn. 246, 248, 175 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1970) (to defraud by check defendant must be
found to have intended to defraud person who cashed check). As defined by the Minnesota Criminal Code, intent means "the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause
the result specified or believes that his act, if successful, will cause that result." MINN.
STAT. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (1982).
The Supreme Court resolved the issue of intent in criminal prosecutions under the
Sherman Act in United States v. United State Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). In light
of the Minnesota Supreme Court's willingness to look to federal precedent when interpreting the state statute, the federal standard of intent provides insight into the standard to be
applied in Minnesota. In Gypsum the Court distinguished between two levels of intent.
The stricter standard required that the action be taken with the "conscious object" of
producing illegal effects. The lesser standard required only "[k]nowledge that the proscribed effects would most likely follow." 438 U.S. at 445. The Court concluded that the
lower standard, that of knowledge of probable consequences, is enough to find criminal
liability in the antitrust area. I. The Court noted that the general criminal definition of
intent is appropriate for Sherman Act violations. Requiring proof of a conscious desire on
the part of the violator would be unduly cumulative and burdensome on the prosecution.
Id. at 447; see also I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 34, § 310a.
46. See 294 N.W.2d at 306-07.
47. Id.
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ABC programming carried by them. Third, the contract did not
actually prohibit ABC programming because it was still available
using KAAL's signal. Finally, the contract did not preclude other
stations from broadcasting in the county by using facilities other
than Watonwan's.
Rather than seizing the opportunity to elucidate the new statute, the Minnesota court failed to offer any authority, let alone
any analytical framework, legal or economic, to justify its conclusory characterization that the nonduplication provision was
"unlike the type of agreement classified as a refusal to deal." From
the laundry list of facts presented, a possible inference is that the
court did not find all the elements of a refusal to deal in the sense
of Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. F T C 48 and Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange. 49 In these cases there were concerted efforts by

traders at one level to inhibit competition by other traders on the
same level by making it difficult for competitors to obtain needed
suppliers, customers, or access to critical facilities. The Watonwan
court apparently saw no concerted action at one level to cut out specifc competitors, no clear purpose to do so, and no significant anticompetitive effect.
Even if these inferences are correct and thereby provide some
insight into the analytical framework to be used in refusal to deal
claims, the court ultimately failed to analyze the exclusivity provision in the KAAL-Watonwan contract in two respects. First, the
court's analysis ignored the general legislative purpose of promoting competition which underlies both state and federal antitrust
law. Second, the court failed to consider the specific intent of the
Minnesota legislature in condemning as a per se violation all contracts between two or more persons refusing to deal with others.
The contract between KAAL and Watonwan appears to be an
exclusive dealing contract involving a commitment by a distributor like Watonwan to distribute only the ABC programming of
KAAL. 50 The principal objectives of exclusive dealing contracts
are to foreclose the market opportunities of the seller's competitors
and to assure a stable market for the seller. 5 1
It is clear that the nonduplication provision in the KAALWatonwan contract constituted a restraint on intrabrand competi48. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
49. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
50. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 7, § 163, at 471.
51.

P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 559, at 810-11 (3d ed. 1981).
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tion among ABC stations. The severity of the restraint depended
to some degree on the alternatives available to KSTP. It is not
certain from the facts whether alternative means of distribution
existed. 52 Watonwan may have been KSTP's only access to this
market. In any event, there is no indication in the court's discussion of any benign competitive purpose for the nonduplication
provision. Was the restraint necessary or beneficial to promote interbrand competition? 53 Did it provide "economic advantage" to
54
buyers and sellers in the form of cost savings?
The absence of any showing of benign competitive purpose simplifies the analysis of the nonduplication provision. The restraint,
in the absence of such a showing, seems to fall within the language
of Minnesota Statutes section 325D.53, subdivision 1(3), making
agreements to refuse to deal with another person illegal per se. 55 A
commentator points out that the statute does not require that parties to a refusal to deal be in competition. 56 Thus, the provision
appears to outlaw vertical boycotts such as exclusive dealing or
requirements contracts. The legislative history supports such a
57
construction.
Characterization of per se offenses becomes a problem only in
cases where there may be plausible competitive benefits. As indi58
cated by the Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS:
[I]n characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it
tends to show effect, . . .the purpose of the practice are to

threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free market economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed "to increase economic efficiency
52. 294 N.W.2d at 307.
53. See P. AREEDA, supra note 51, § 559, at 811-12.
54. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-35 (1961).
55. MINN. STAT. § 325D.53, subd. 1(3) (1982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8015,
subd. 1(3) (1978)) provides:
Subdivision 1: Without limiting § 325D.51, the following shall be deemed to
restrain trade or commerce unreasonably and are unlawful:
(3) A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons refusing
to deal with another person, exept a refusal to deal by associations, trading
boards, or exchanges when predicated upon a failure to comply with rules of
membership.
56. Note, supra note 1, at 932.
57. Id.
58. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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and render markets more, rather than less, competitive." 59
The Supreme Court indicated an abbreviated rule of reason analysis should satisfy this inquiry. 6°
In the Watonwan decision, no such analysis was evident nor was
any benign competitive purpose for the restraint readily apparent.
The refusal to deal should have been characterized as a per se offense pursuant to the statute.
The third claim raised by Watonwan was based on the provisions of the 1971 Act statute which forbid actions constituting an
"unreasonable restraint of trade."' 6' This provision codifies the
"rule of reason" doctrine developed by the United States Supreme
Court prior to the passage of the 1971 Act. 62 The Watonwan
court's treatment of this issue gives almost no insight into the standards applicable under Minnesota law. The court held that under
the facts of the case, the lower court's determination was not in
63
clear error as a matter of law, thus, its findings must be accepted.
No evidence indicating the contract's impact on the advertising
market was presented at trial. 64 The lack of evidence precluded a
well-reasoned decision.
In relying on federal and another state's case law in Walonwan,
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopts one commentator's view of
65
the desirable method of interpreting the state antitrust statute.
Where there is no conflicting Minnesota case law, no clear conflict
between state and federal law, and no purely procedural question,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should turn to precedent in foreign
jurisdictions to maintain consistency and predictability among the
antitrust laws of the various jurisdictions. 66 This view would prevent conflicts and provide businesses with a more reasonable opportunity to comply with federal and state law, thus advancing the
purpose of antitrust statutes. 67 The Minnesota Antitrust Act of
1971 codifies much pre-1971 federal case law and follows the pro59. Id. at 19-20 (footnote, citations omitted).
60. Id. at 19 n.33.
61. MINN. STAT. § 325D.51 (1982) (previously MINN. STAT. § 325.8013 (1978)). The
statute states: "A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in
unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful." Id.
62. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
63. 294 N.W.2d at 307.
64. Id.
65. See Note, supra note 1, at 939-40.

66. Id.
67. Id.
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visions of the Sherman Act to a significant degree. 6 In light of the
similarity of the statutes, in the absence of a clear conflict with
federal law, states should look to federal precedent and avoid un69
necessary divergence from common practice.

68. MINN. STAT. § 325D.51 (1982) ("A contract, combination, or conspiracy between
two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful") (emphasis
added). This provision in a codification of the federal "rule of reason" doctrine. MINN.
STAT. § 325D.53 (1982), which lists per se violations, incorporates § 3 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1977). The Minnesota provisions are, however, much more detailed,
listing numerous specific actions which are deemed per se illegal. One Minnesota district
court has specifically held that the 1971 Act is a codification of federal antitrust law. State
v. Robert L. Carr Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,983, at 74,185 (Minn. 5th Dist. Ct.
1978),
69. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 34, § 208, at 58. When enacting the
1971 Act, the legislature left out a clause providing that federal judicial decisions are to
control interpretation of the state statute. The Uniform State Antitrust Act of 1973 contains no express language making federal precedent controlling in the interpretation of the
state statute. However, the Commissioner's Prefatory Note states, "Since the Act parallels
the federal antitrust structure in its basic prohibitions, the following of federal antitrust
precedent should be encouraged." UNIF. STATE ANTITRUST ACT Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 733 (1973). In addition, the Commissioner's Comments after sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10 contain references to federal statutory or case law. Section 2,
dealing with unreasonable restraints of trade, expressly states in the Commissioner's Comments that the section makes available to the states "the relevant body of federal precedent." Id. at 736.
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